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Abstract
This paper presents the preliminary progress of an industry driven programme to improve
the data monitoring of safety/hazard near miss reporting from front line staff of a branch
of a multinational energy supply company in Ireland. The paper discusses the main
factors that emerged as possible causes for underreporting and the course of action
selected for addressing them. The initiative, which is only in operation for 4 months has
already led to an increase in reporting of “near misses” by a factor of nine. Furthermore,
the level and detail of the reports is far greater than had previously being received.

Introduction
It is recognised as Best Practice that collating and monitoring of data on safety incidents or reported
near misses would lead to better learning and indeed the avoidance of accidents in the future. (Jones
et al 1999). Various studies have showed the relationship between near miss incidents and actual
accidents pointing out that reducing the number of near misses that occur will very likely reduce the
likelihood of full accidents, which in turn would lead to less severe human, economic and
environmental impact., (Bird & Germain, 1966; Heinrich, 1980; Tye, 1976).
Within this paper, the experience of the safety advisor within a division of a larger multinational
energy supply company was able to identify from report statistics supplied by the Head Health
and Safety Office that near miss data from field staff in his division as a whole was not being
reported. This data has the potential to identify latent hazards in plant, equipment, procedures
and in design of high voltage (HV) equipment that may otherwise go unnoticed.
The division in question is the Asset Management Service, AMS, within the company, which is
responsible for providing a full range of commissioning services on new and maintained HV
plant & equipment. AMS also ensures the correct operation of protection schemes on the
Transmission systems.
During 2009 this section of the company only had only reported 2 near misses for events of
trivial importance related to offices and nothing referring to site operations. The 80 staff in the
division spend the majority of their time in the field on site works. The fact that there was no
reporting from the field was of concern to the senior management team in AMS.

The Issue of Underreporting
Various studies on organizational-level under-reporting linked the issue to multiple factors.
Typical issues would be the general safety climate, the specific industrial, sector, the company
size and the perceived lack of management engagement (Leigh et al., 2004; Oleinick et al.,

1995, Daniels and Marlow, 2005, Clarke, 1998, Probst et al., 2008; Zohar, 2003) at individuallevel under-reporting has been ascribed to factors such as fear of reprisals, loss of benefits or a
fatalistic attitude that injuries are a fact of life in certain lines of work (Webb et al.,
1989;Pransky et al., 1999; Sinclair and Tetrick, 2004, (Pransky et al., 1999).
From a previous study performed in Ireland in the construction sector (McDonald N and
Hrymak V. 2002) it appears also that the presence of a safety representative on site shows a
very strong relationship with hazards reporting and safety compliance. The report of the study
states that “safety representatives influence safety compliance not only through their influence
on the response to audits and hazards but also through other means. Thus they encourage the
reporting of hazards and help ensure that these reports lead to better safety compliance on site.
Their presence also makes it significantly less likely that workers will continue to work in
hazardous situations”.
In the context of the present study the positive effects of the safety representative on site were
reinforced thanks to the presence of the specific organizational role played by Safety Advisor
within the specific division.
The Safety Advisor in this case was an interface between the central Health and Safety
Department and Asset Management Services and He was tasked to take care of the division
specific safety issues involved in the day to day operations.
The Safety Advisor was able to work on site with the staff and perform informal interviews in
order to try and identify the main issues for this lack of reporting. Through this process three
factors emerged as possible causes for underreporting:
1. The current definition of “near miss reporting ” and indeed the actual safety training
received by the staff were confusing.
2. The actual reporting framework was received as extra paper work to be sent to the
immediate supervisor in a very fomal process.
3. Poor feedback on reported problems.
Overall the “near misses” reporting process was seen as something the staff was told to do
rather than something they should be doing for their own benefit. As a result it was perceived as
“an extra task not a value”.

A simple plan for action
In identifying the best course of action to take to try and improve reporting of the following
elements were taken into account:
A. A dedicated safety advisor for the Asset Management section to bridege the gap
between the Safety Management System and day to day operations.
B. a different definition of near misses that would highlight the relevance in respect to the
everyday operations and a proper communication of it to the workers
C. A reporting form more closely related to forms currently part of day to day usage
D. A feedback mechanism to ensure the benefits of reporting in terms of follow up would
reach the front line staff in charge of reporting.

The Role of the Safety Advisor
As already pointed out the operational safety advisor for the Asset Management Services
(AMS) division of the company is a specific recognised organizational role established to take
proper action for the safety issues of the division of a specific technical nature rather than the

management of occupational health on site, which was still dealt by the Central Health and
Safety Office. The Safety Advisor in fact had to also develop personal technical competencies
for AMS in parallel with the safety role.; which in turn enable him/her to work side by side with
the rest of the technical staff of the division.
The availability of a safety advisor close at hand similar to a safety representative but with the
managerial role to enforce and follow up on issues raised on the field was highlighted as a
strong guarantee towards the achievement of a better promotion of a reporting culture and a
closer feedback to the front line staff, in line with the findings of the HSA research report for
the construction sector (McDonald and Hrymak 2002).

Near Misses, definitions and communications
The definition of near misses previously provided by the Central Health And Safety Office of
the company stated that:
‘A near miss is an incident where personal injury was narrowly avoided or where damage to
property-only occurred. A good catch is an unsafe condition/act, which if left unaddressed could
result in an injury. Such incidents may be early warning signs of hazards that could eventually
result in serious consequences. By reporting such incidents you will help make the workplace
safer for yourself, your colleagues and visitors. Remember, what is a near miss today could
result in an accident tomorrow.’
The staff understanding of the above definition also reinforced by the type of information
provided by newsletters and the periodic training promoted by the Central office was that a near
miss belonged only to realm of occupational health on site and did not apply to specific
technical issues related to operations. The link between the day to day anomalies in the field and
the ability to make work practices more efficient, of a higher quality and safer was not being
recognised.
The Safety Advisor was able to introduce among his fellow workers an alternative definition
and to promulgate it through a specific meeting.
‘An opportunity to improve safety, health, environmental and quality practice based on a
condition, an incident or an observation with minor outcomes but with the potential for more
serious consequence. ‘
The workers were made aware that the consequences proposed in the definition can include but
were not limited to the following:
Property damage
Damage to the environment
Business interruption
Deviations for example from the work instruction or procedure
Potential or actual injury to staff
The definition above was presented and discussed with the personnel by the safety Advisor in
the following ways:
i. Organizing a meeting with the engineering manager where it was agreed to produce a
document outlining the benefits of an integrated approach to the management of quality,
safety, health and environmental issues.
ii. Providing a presentation during a periodic team briefing meeting in the AMS section
where the alternative definition was discussed and amended
iii. Sending a communication through email to all AMS staff

iv. Reiterating on the presentation regarding the near miss management approach at
Specialist Team meeting and subsequent team meetings attended
v. Promoting the idea also informally on site
The initial feedback was that the new definition was accepted as a better fit to the working
environment in AMS since it gave the opportunity to report or capture technical deviations or
observations that commissioning and maintenance staff can encounter in their daily tasks.

A new reporting framework: making better use of what is already there
The new reporting framework for the initiative was introduced as an informal process. The
future direction of it to be embedded in the commissioning checklists that are already used as
part of the sign off for the operators working on site.
Currently commissioning based reporting has two elements. The first is the on-site Snag List
Form(see figure 1) and the other is the Project Follow-Up Reporting form. The snag list is to be
given to the person on site responsible for correcting it and then entered into a so called
“SharePoint folder” where the design team can monitor it and make the any design changes.
The Project Follow-Up Report form is given to the people identified as responsible for solving
the issues and also sent electronically to the designer and manager of substation design. This
form should also be copied to the SharePoint folder where the actions can be monitored. The
deviations recorded on the snag list However or the follow up report forms are not currently
considered as possible elements of the miss reports statistics at central level.

Figure 1: company existing Snag list for commissioning operations
Further a Database has been introduced to collect and monitor the commissioning checklist as
records of the operations completed.
The database has a function that provides report templates for commissioning and “condition
based assessment” of assets and records the results. These templates are designed by AMS staff.
The templates also provide the option of recording deviations in an ‘additional comments’ field
and to import or export documents/files/jpeg/PDF. Reports can also be generated for any
specific asset.

The safety advisor prompted the workers to start using that part of the current reporting forms
for forwarding information on near misses via mail to him and whenever possible attach
pictures of the possible event being reported. Figure 2 reports the example of a picture attached
to one of the reports (“Failure of 110 kV cable sealing end”).

Figure 2: Example of a picture taken by one of the worker and sent as part of a near miss report
on the failure of 110 kV cable sealing end
The advantage of using existing tools for reporting is that the use of ad hoc extra forms may fail
to provide a real-time picture of routine operations supporting performance management and
predictive risk management. Furthermore the use of many discrete tools implies that much
valuable data gathered about the operation are stored and analyzed in different formats and by
different and often disjointed departments. This makes it difficult to obtain an integrated risk
registry (Leva et al 2010), while the effort of integrating existing data collection tools can be a
much more practical way to operate the data monitoring reducing the paperwork.
Another issue existing with the previous reporting system is the fact that the health and safety
office at central level presents a classifications system for near misses with categories that are
fairly generic and therefore are not able to really direct possible improvements and follow up
initiative on specific technical areas in a meaningful way. An example of this is observable from
figure 3 reporting the headings under which near misses are currently categorized. It is clear that
a category named “electrical” is far too generic to be able to provide any clear indication for a
division in charge of commissioning HV equipment and installations. The proposed
enhancement of the classification introduced by the imitative would only require to distinguish
electrical faults according to the type of equipment they refer to (e.g. Neutral Earth Switch,
Cable Sealing Ends Links , Busbars, G.I.S Switchgear , HV Lightning Arrestor, HV
Transformer Bushing, Oil Filled Circuit Breaker , Capacitor Bank etc..). This further distinction
would enable also to classify possible troubleshooting adopted for recurring faults.

Figure 3: Existing near miss categories for event reported across the entire company in 2009

The feedback mechanism
As already pointed out the main purpose of reporting near misses is the possibility of using the
resulting data to initiate improvements and possible interventions able to prevent more serious
events and accidents. Further the feedback to the reporters on the follow up initiated thanks to
their reporting is an important motivational factor. Therefore the safety advisor had to take care
that after each report a communication about the status of the analysis and the possible initiated
action would reach the front line staff in charge of reporting.
Since the beginning of the initiative 29 near misses have been reported in the past 12 months
and the follow up of 62% of them was already completed and communicated to the report
initiators.

Preliminary Results
The initiative in the first 12 months was already able to increase by 14 times the amount of
reports that were previously obtained within a year, further the level of technical details
acquired and their relevance is much more meaningful and in depth in comparison to what
collected previously.
Table 1: Initial outline of results of the Initiative
Near Miss Reports
Centrally collected Events in 2009
Events collected at the division level of
Engineering Solutions 2009
Near Misses collected for AMS in 2009

Amount
768
60

Near Misses collected for AMS in 12 months after
new definition was introduced (12 months approx.)

29

2

Location
Site / Office
100% of them are related to the
Office
100% of them are related to the
Office
90% of them are related to Site

Conclusions
Data collection programs such as these provide a real-time review of current safety issues in the
operations departments. Real-time data review facilitates the identification of areas where
modifications to working practices, equipment, training programs or standard operating
procedures might be appropriate. Such modification might reduce costs as it improves the
availability of equipment and prevent the occurrence of future safety events (incidents or
accidents) as well. This seems to be a very proactive way of managing safety with very positive
implications for day to day operations efficiency as well. The key to success is arriving at the
desired cultural climate as a result of the system changes introduced. This is why a careful
understanding of people dynamics is not to be underestimated. In the present experience the role
of a safety advisor close at hand on site with the capacity to follow up on issues raised on the
field was highlighted as a very important factor towards the achievement of a better promotion
of a reporting culture and a closer feedback to the front line staff.

References
Clarke, S., 1998. Organizational factors affecting the incident reporting of train
drivers.Work & Stress 12, 6–16.
Bird, F. E. & Germain, G. L. (1966). Damage Control. New York: American Management
Assoc. Inc.
Daniels, C., Marlow, P., 2005. Literature Reviewon the Reporting ofWorkplace Injury
Trends (HSL/2005/36). Health and Safety Laboratory, Harpur Hill, UK.
Heinrich, H. W. (1980). Industrial Accident Prevention: A Safety Management Approach,
(5th ed.). ISBN 0 07 028061 4.
Jones S., Kirchsteiger C., Bjerke W., The importance of near miss reporting to further
improve safety performance. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 12
(1999) 59–67
Leigh, J.P., Marcin, J.P., Miller, T.R., 2004. An estimate of the U.S. government’s
undercount of non-fatal occupational injuries. Journal of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine 46, 10–18
Leva M.C Cahill J Kay A Losa G. Mc Donald N. 2010 The Advancement of a New Human
Factors Report – ‘The Unique Report’ - Facilitating Flight Crew Auditing of
Performance/Operations, as part of an Airline’s Safety Management System.
Ergonomics Feb;53(2):164-83.
McDonald N and Hrymak V. Safety Behaviour in the construction Sector. HAS Research
Report 2002.
Oleinick, A., Gluck, J.V., Guire, K.E., 1995. Establishment size and risk of occupational
injury. American Journal of Industrial Medicine 28, 1–21.
Pransky, G., Snyder, T., Dembe, A., Himmelstein, J., 1999. Under-reporting of workrelated
disorders in the workplace: a case study and review of the literature. Ergonomics 42,
171–182.
Probst T.M. Estrada A. X., 2010 Accident under-reporting among employees: Testing the
moderating influence of psychological safety climate and supervisor enforcement of
safety practices. Accident Analysis and Prevention 42 (2010) 1438–1444

Probst, T.M., Brubaker, T.L., Barsotti, A., 2008. Organizational under-reporting of injury
rates: an examination of the moderating effect of organizational safety climate. Journal
of Applied Psychology 93 (5), 1147–1154.
Sinclair, R.R., Tetrick, L.E., 2004. Pay and benefits: the role of compensation systems in
workplace safety. In: Barling, J., Frone, M. (Eds.), Psychology of Workplace Safety.
American Psychological Association,Washington, DC, pp. 181–201.
Tye, J. (1976). Accident Ratio Study, 1974/75. London: British Safety Council.
Webb, G.R., Redman, S., Wilkinson, C., Sanson-Fisher, R.W., 1989. Filtering effects in
reporting work injuries. Accident Analysis and Prevention 21, 115–123.
Zohar, D., 2003. The influence of leadership and climate on occupational health and safety.
In: Hoffman, D.A., Tetrick, L.E. (Eds.), Health and Safety in Organizations: A
Multilevel Perspective. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.

